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RESEARCH REPORT

ACHIEVING BETTER INTERFACE BETWEEN LAND, SEA, AND
AIR FORCES--THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT LEGISLATION


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1991



AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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ACHIEVING BETTER INTERFACE BETWEEN LAND, SEA, AND
AIR FORCES: THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT LEGISLATION

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Achieving Better Interface Between Land, Sea, and Air Forces - The Historical Evidence Does not Support Legislation.

AUTHOR: David H. Milne-Smith, Wing Commander, Royal Air Force.

Regardless of the final outcome of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, downsizing of the US armed forces will continue. The restructuring process will undoubtedly involve a certain amount of disagreement between the arms of the Service as professionals attempt to influence the final outcome.

If a new structure cannot be formulated from within the Department of Defense (DOD), legislation may well be needed to resolve the issue. The historical evidence since World War II would certainly point to such action being taken in the Congress if inter-service rivalry is allowed to spill over outside the confines of the DOD. This paper argues that such rivalry is healthy if it can be controlled within the armed forces.

This paper emphasizes the need for a new force with an integrated command and control structure across single service boundaries as the champion of joint warfighting for the future. Although details of attempts to restructure the unified commands are sketchy, it seems clear that the number of those formations will be reduced. What is proposed is a new formation to be known as the Joint Core Force. Forces

allocated to this new formation would be under the command of one unified commander, thus simplifying the command and control arrangements and ensuring that inter-service rivalry is managed from within. The Force is also designed to take on broader and yet more realistic defense options for the future, although a review of the Areas of Responsibility for the unified commands lies outside the scope of this paper.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Wing Commander David H. Milne-Smith joined the Royal Air Force in 1965 as a pilot and has flown single seat aircraft for the majority of his career. He has served with the RAF in Bahrain, with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force on secondment and on loan service with the Royal Norwegian Air Force. He has flown the Jaguar aircraft in the Strike/Attack and Reconnaissance roles, both in the UK and in Germany. He attended the Royal Australian Air Force Advanced Staff Course in Canberra in 1986 and has recently completed a tour as Squadron Commander of a Jaguar Squadron in the United Kingdom. Following graduation from the Air War College, he will serve as an Exchange Staff officer at Tactical Air Command Headquarters at Langley, Virginia.

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ACHIEVING BETTER INTERFACE BETWEEN LAND, SEA, AND AIR
FORCES - THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
LEGISLATION

INTRODUCTION

Since the National Security Act was passed in 1947, the U.S. Government has made innumerable attempts to militate against the rivalry among the armed services. By creating a separate Air Force, Congress helped aggravate the rivalries. Most recently, the Goldwater-Nichols Act attempts to improve the joint warfighting capability of the U.S. armed forces by specifically addressing the issue of inter-service rivalry. Evidence of this focus is widely available; it was perhaps best assessed by Representative Samuel Stratton who observed that, were Congress to stifle the interplay in the armed forces, the path would lead to disaster. (1:31)

The armed services are capable of different and at times overlapping missions; together they provide only one of the elements of national power. Disagreements among members of the armed services do not appear to be seen as honest concern over service roles and missions, but as inter-service rivalry or parochialism. The history of legislation aimed at the military following WW II supports this view. The military will have to find better ways of presenting common solutions to the Executive Branch of Government when warfighting or force posturing options are

being considered by the U.S. military. Each of the arms of the services is able to offer the government strategic and operational options, and therein lies one of the strengths of the U.S armed forces. There is certainly the possibility that as downsizing of the total force takes place, and the number of military options for the application or display of force world-wide is reduced, Congress will continue to demand single service options for military involvement to be fused into a single recommended course of action.

One solution to this problem could be the establishment of a truly joint force as a part of the restructuring of the military to comply with the reduced defense budget authorization. What is recommended is the establishment of a Joint Core Force (JCF) consisting of elements of all of the armed services formed into a permanent unit for training, planning and the execution of operational contingencies.

This paper will examine the threats to U.S. security interests by first reviewing changes that have taken place since Mikhail Gorbachev took office in the USSR. Against this background, the possible changes world-wide which might lead to greater regional instability on a world-wide scale would affect the way in which the US might choose to use military force to protect her national interests. Broad national interests in this context include the survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its

fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. The paper will then briefly review the history of legislation aimed specifically at eradicating inter-service rivalry, and outline an option for change within the armed services of the U.S. with a view to negating such legislation. Rivalry in the context of this paper refers to the claim of one arm of the services to be as good as, or as effective as another, when military options are being considered.

As a result of the changed character of the Soviet threat, warning time may have increased, but instability remains in many regions of the world. This paper will substantiate the need for an effective joint force to protect U.S. vital interests world-wide. More specifically, it will recommend establishment of a JCF as a model to replace the current U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). The JCF would be more suitable in structure, and in terms of the command and control arrangements for deployment to protect those vital interests in the world. The proposed force would be similar to an element of the one outlined by the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, that will be "more mobile, highly ready, well equipped... and with solid power-projection capabilities." (2:3)

The key to the proposed force is that it should be drawn from all of the armed services and capable of rapid deployment anywhere in the world by a variety of means. It is possible that with a reduced force structure, the

responsibilities of unified commands such as USCENTCOM and the U.S Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) could be combined. In addition to this, Operation Desert Shield/Storm has proved that the deployment of a force, even if it were to be limited to USCENTCOM's scale, cannot be completed rapidly. This paper assumes that if the military response to a particular situation were to take more than two weeks, there would be sufficient time to coordinate a much larger build-up to counter the threat: that build-up could take place around the nucleus of the JCF. This is considered to be an acceptable limitation of the JCF in order to ensure that the span of command is acceptable for its commander. The prospect of being able to undertake simultaneous military operations in two or more regions of the world will not be addressed in this paper but it will undoubtedly form part of the review process for restructuring of the total force.

The JCF would have at its center a joint HQ capable of deploying with the force to the theater of operations. The proposed force would be an alternative to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) which was converted to the USCENTCOM by President Reagan in 1983. This unified command was established specifically to counter the Soviet threat to Southeast Asia following their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and it may well have outlived its effectiveness as the champion of the joint cause. The force structure was designed to give the USCENTCOM a role at least equal to - if not greater than - local military forces in a

wide variety of scenarios. (3:1) CENTCOM's objectives placed its anti-Soviet mission at the top of the list of its concerns, regional stability came second , and the reduction of the potential for regional conflict third. (4:25) The future may well see a reversal of this order with the JCF acting in concert with regional or multinational forces in order to protect US and other national interests.

The JCF would be more realistically able to meet the threats to U.S. security and the challenges of a wide range of contingencies into the 21st century. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm will certainly provide many lessons in force projection capabilities for the future, since the initial deployment was carried out by many of the forces earmarked for USCENTCOM. It is clear from this experience that any new formation will also have to be capable of acting as the nucleus for expansion to meet a variety of threats, both national and international. If the military can demonstrate true integration at the operational level, and offer, at least to the NCA, a coordinated and appropriate response to a variety of security issues, there will no longer be a need to use legislation to attempt to achieve this.

THE UNSTABLE NEW WORLD ORDER

The pace of the international change since Michail Gorbachev took office in 1985 has surprised most political

experts. Since the end of WW II the focus of the U.S. national security strategy has been dominated by the need to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and her allies. Now that the military element of the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved, the future of the whole of Eastern and Central Europe is uncertain.

Although the superpower confrontation or Cold War is no longer at its previous level of intensity, the USSR is still the only nation capable of militarily devastating the U.S. The issue of nationalism or regional hegemony continues to lead to unrest, not only within the USSR but also in many other regions of the world. Recent violent unrest in the Baltic region, disturbance in Central Africa, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq are examples of such instability, the outcome of which cannot be predicted. Fueled by the proliferation of sophisticated conventional, chemical, and biological weapons and technologies, many Third World conflicts will continue to threaten U.S interests, and those of her allies and trading partners. The reality of nuclear weapons in the hands of more nations is clear.

As a result of the easing of East - West tension the world may not be any more stable. President Bush has stressed that the U.S. should have a pivotal responsibility for ensuring the stability of the international balance in the new era. (5:2)

THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR CHANGE - A BRIEF HISTORY

As a result of the easing of East - West tensions, the U.S. Government has embarked on a program of force reduction which will draw-down current levels of the all volunteer force of 2.13 million active service personnel by more than 200,000 by 1994, (6:318) and cuts of 25% have been suggested by many commentators. As the reorganization of the armed forces takes place, a heated debate will ensue before the new and greatly reduced force structure is decided upon. Such was the case following WW II, the Korean War and the conflict in Vietnam. Individual service interests will certainly be aired during this debate. As with other truly professional organizations, each service believes that, for almost every security problem, it is capable of effective force employment to serve the national interest. For example, the action taken to rescue American hostages held in Iran could have been carried out by no more than two of the armed services but all four insisted on participating in the mission. (6:361)

Since WW II, more than 20 separate studies and numerous reform bills have altered the way in which the military goes about its business. (8:27) President Truman submitted a proposal for defense organization to Congress on December 19, 1945, which was similar to the Army's views. He called for a single defense department with a single Secretary and a Military Chief of Staff; he ignored the Navy's proposal

for a National Security Council. (9:20) Congress compromised with an Act incorporating elements of both the Army and the Navy proposals. The National Security Act (NSA), which reflected this approach, was passed on July 24, 1947, and signed into law two days later. Although the Act established a single Secretary of Defense, he was to head the "National Military Establishment" rather than an Executive Department, and he was given the task of establishing general policies and programs, and exercising general direction, authority, and control. (10:19) In deference to the Army, the Act established a War Council and a separate Air Force, but in deference to the Navy no Armed Forces Chief of Staff was established to head the JCS. (11:47)

Amendments to the NSA in 1949, 1953 and 1958 were further to centralize decision-making within the Defense Department in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Robert McNamara entered office as the Secretary of Defense in January, 1961, and he determined to take a more active role than that of his predecessors. Based on his management experience, he felt that each service had developed disjointed and uncoordinated military strategies in an effort to justify individual funding levels. (12:25) On the other hand, his immediate predecessor Thomas Gates had felt that the differing interests of the heads of the Services helped to ensure that all viewpoints were fully aired, and provided for increased flexibility in the

budgetary process. (13:4) Many of McNamara's ideas have become institutionalized within the DOD. The DOD formulates its budget using a five year framework, and systems analysis and cost-effectiveness studies are utilized extensively by the Services in the development of new weapons systems.

(14:36) The issue of inter-service rivalry was again raised in 1964 when the fusion of the corporate loyalties of the Services of the U.S. came in for severe criticism from within the DOD. (15:57)

The impetus for reform early in the 1980s was provided by the failure of the attempt to rescue U.S. hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the terrorist attack on the Marine force in Lebanon. Despite the success of Operation "Urgent Fury", the invasion of Grenada in October, 1983, a great deal of criticism of the conduct of the operation followed. In discussing the Grenada operation before the Senate on 2 October, 1985, Senator Sam Nunn said:

In sum, reports and analyses conducted after the invasion reveal a woeful lack of inter-Service coordination in planning the operation...Furthermore, the Services demonstrated a remarkable lack of knowledge about how each other operates. (16:26-27)

Senator Barry Goldwater was as scathing during the debate:

The inability of the military Services to work together effectively has not gone unnoticed...As someone who has devoted his entire life to the military, I am saddened that the Services are still unable to put national interests above parochial interests. (17:12)

The inability of the JCS to develop a national military strategy was identified as the root of the problem, and it was felt that individual services were more interested in vying with one another for the resources to carry out their own strategies. (18:41)

During the same hearings and based upon the testimonies of several former Defense Secretaries and JCS members, Congress proposed strengthening the JCS organization by increasing the power of the Chairman - in effect making him a military Chief of Staff. Others, however, saw the strength in differing professional views, suggesting that the discussions in Congress had grotesquely distorted the issue of inter-service rivalry. (19:196)

The criticism of the military during the debate resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Whether this legislation will improve the warfighting capability of the U.S. armed forces must remain to be seen, even if all of the organizational changes have taken place to comply with the law. Operation Desert Storm will provide the first test of the effectiveness of the legislation, but the international nature of the resolution of that crisis through the United Nations places it in an entirely different category. Perhaps the most important part of the legislation as it concerns improving combat capability involves the increased authority vested in the CINCs. The commanders of unified and specified combatant commands have Combatant Command (COCOM)

to enable them to perform the command functions necessary for their assigned missions. Their operational chain of command is straightforward and the legislation has focused on the CINCs' needs. Whereas the single-service warfighting capability of units under the command of their respective CINCs may have been improved, weakness stems in part from the fact that in peacetime many of the combat forces required for the all-important joint mission are only assigned to the CINC. They do not necessarily belong to one CINC. Even if one could ignore the fact that many units are earmarked for more than one theater of operation, the CINCs still have to rely upon the single service commanders to provide forces for planning and training. Notwithstanding the scale of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the role of the proposed JCF will be to respond rapidly to contingencies on a scale now envisaged for the Joint Task Force.

THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

General Bernard Rogers, Army Chief of Staff in June, 1979, spoke of the Rapid Deployment Force (later to become the RDJTF) as a "quick strike force of 110,000 troops to respond to crisis in the Persian Gulf or other hot spots outside of NATO." (20:53) By late October, 1979, guidance was given to the services to create the command structure for the new force which became the core of American power projection under President Reagan; it was turned into a

formal unified command, the USCENTCOM, in 1980. The force was to be used only for contingencies in the Persian Gulf and for this mission it drew on a number of combat units from all of the U.S. armed services. (21:54) On paper, the units deployed as part of the force would be placed under the operational command of the commander of USCENTCOM. In reality many of those forces remain under single-service control. Air Force units, for example are under the command of USCENAF as the overall service component commander, but the Tactical Air units belong to the commander of Tactical Air Command in peacetime. Critics of the RDJTF have concentrated upon the many layers in the command chain which serve to obstruct and complicate the force. Single service units which have to be changed from one command structure to another were singled out by one critic when he noted:

It does not require genius to discern that the cluttered and fragmented command relationships surrounding the RDJTF, which are to a large extent the product of inter-service rivalry for the rapid deployment mission, are fertile ground for military defeat. (22:67)

The same criticism could be levelled at USCENTCOM today. It is clear that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation gave more authority to the CINCs, but the command and control arrangements seem to create more problems than they solve. A commander needs to command his forces in peacetime if he is to fight them effectively in war.

Many of the proposed solutions to the ineffective command arrangements do not, however, provide for the employment of a joint force to make best use of the unique attributes of each services' arms. As an example of this, recommendations have included a new sea-based force under a unified command, with the mission solely in the hands of the U.S. Marine Corps. (23:69) Such a force would also be very vulnerable prior to deployment ashore, and many areas of the world would not be accessible from the sea. A hostile Iran in the current Gulf crisis would have made entry into the Arabian Gulf a more dangerous operation than has been the case. An all Marine force such as the MAGTAF is totally expeditionary, and it is designed to interface with ships at sea and with combat forces ashore. (24:31)

In short, what is required for the future is a truly joint force with both tactical and strategic mobility, and under the operational command and control of a unified command structure. The force needs to be capable of deploying to any part of the world, by a variety of means matched to the specific situation. The key to the JCF is that it offers a force capable of demonstrating cooperation between all arms of the service since it is structured as a cohesive unit in peacetime. Command and control arrangements do not have to be changed when the force is required to perform its duty. There is a real danger that if "jointness" cannot be demonstrated both at the strategic and operational levels, Congress will again turn to

legislation, as perhaps it should, in an effort to resolve the issue. With downsizing underway, the U.S. will require a smaller but no less effective force in the future. The proposed JCF would offer the U.S. the flexibility to react on the low-to-medium end of the conflict scale as an individual entity, and also as part of a coalition force. It seems unlikely that a smaller U.S. total force will be able to support the number of unified and specified commands which exist today.

Before looking in detail at the proposed JCF, it is necessary to review the argument thus far. From the National Security Act of 1947 to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 there have been a number of lively political debates and the recurring theme has been a perceived problem of inter-service rivalry. Numerous operations undertaken by the U.S. military have been criticized for their lack of cooperation, a matter specifically addressed under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is premature to assess the success of the operations now being undertaken in Southwest Asia. There will certainly be a detailed examination of Operation Desert Shield/Storm now that the war is over, and the inter-service rivalries suppressed by the elation of victory will be addressed. Whereas the military will concentrate on the command and control lessons, Congress may choose to concentrate on any rivalry between the services. There is little evidence to suggest that such an operation will be the norm in the future; still, its outcome may

provide lessons in developing the force structure of the future. In the process of review, it will still be necessary to plan for a range of realistic contingencies, both in terms of scale, and force mix. The Composite Wing structure outlined by General McPeak while he was CINCPACAF is a good example of one of a range of options available for the future. (25:4-12)

THE PROPOSED JOINT CORE FORCE

Secretary Cheney stressed that force reductions would have to be managed with great care, and that careful planning would be required for a full range of realistic contingencies. (26:1) What is proposed in this paper is a joint force able to meet the needs of the U.S. into the next century - a force capable of adapting to change and growth, and better able to serve U.S. interests world-wide. Structuring forces to be assigned solely to low intensity conflict would seriously affect the ability of the US to undertake large scale conventional war in the future. The nature of the threat may have changed, but the possibility certainly still exists for US military involvement in medium level conflict in defense of national objectives world-wide. In October, 1986, a military author suggested that a major RDF movement to the Persian Gulf was one of the least likely kinds of conflict, since low intensity conflict in the Third World was far more likely. Perhaps it is just

as well that the Air Force did not allow this prediction to drive resource allocation too hard.(27:124)

The JCF will also have to demonstrate to politicians that inter-service rivalry is healthy and capable of being managed. The idea is not to identify a huge force capable of undertaking any military operation world-wide, but one tailored to meet numerous challenges to U.S. security interests. The JCF would be capable of providing a strong, cohesive unit around which a greater force could be built for contingency operations with longer lead times than the two weeks already mentioned for the JCF.

The HQ element of the JCF could develop operational plans under the guidance of the Joint Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (the JCS J-7) which was formed in 1987. (28:28) For the future, military commitments to alliances such as NATO would still have to be met by U.S. forces, although the scale of those forces will undoubtedly be further reduced. USCENTCOM grew out of the need to deter Soviet aggression in the Southwest Asian theater in the 1980s. In the coming decade the growing possibility of Third World conflicts will complicate the defense arena. As part of the fundamental review of the U.S. forces now being undertaken, the JCF will offer a credible alternative to USCENTCOM.

The types of operations envisioned for the JCF includes intervention on the same scale as the invasion of Grenada, Operation Just Cause in Panama, the attempted hostage rescue

from Iran, or the deterrent force dispatched to Saudi Arabia as a display of intent to the Iraqi government (Operation Desert Shield). Force elements of the JCF would have to be capable of operating at quite different levels to meet a variety of objectives.

The forces dedicated to the JCF must not have commitments to other deployment options, as is the case with the USCENTCOM today. Simplified command and control arrangements are extremely important to ensure that the force is balanced. Healthy inter-service rivalry within the force will be easy to manage and the force mix selected for military operations could be matched to the particular need for military action. The force would satisfy the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in that all appointments at staff and operational levels would be joint, as is the case with staff officers who serve with the USCENTCOM.

All training would involve force elements of the JCF in joint operations and would cover a wide range of contingencies. More importantly, the JCF will be able to harness the individual capabilities of the armed services, and demonstrate individual service professionalism in a joint arena. It is envisioned that the JCF would be capable of undertaking a wide range of options within the spectrum of conflict from counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency on the one hand to medium scale conventional military operations on the other. Confrontations on the scale of Desert Storm would most definitely be outside the purview of

the JCF, but the JCF could certainly form the core for a much larger force, as was the case with CENTCOM in the recent war against Iraq.

The key to the proposed JCF would be a force HQ capable of planning and coordinating military operations to cover likely contingencies at the lower end of the conflict scale. As a model for this, USCENTCOM would become the focus of the new force, but the luxury of being able to concentrate upon specific areas of interest may not be realistic in the future. USCENTCOM is a force of 440,000, including 7 Tactical Fighter Wings, 2 Strategic Bomber Squadrons, 3 Carrier Battle Groups, 5 Army Divisions and 1 1/3 Marine Divisions, and this does not seem to meet the requirements for the future. (29:46)

The key to any deployment force remains the need to get the force to theater of operations as quickly as possible. It had been estimated that by FY 1988, the U.S. would need five weeks to deploy one Marine division and four Army divisions to the Gulf area. Using only the most mobile forces such as a Marine division and the 82nd Airborne Division, the timescale could have been reduced to two weeks. (30:64-65) It is clear that deployment times could be reduced still further with sufficient strategic warning but recent contingency operations involving U.S. troops, such as Grenada or Panama, have offered little such warning. Desert Shield demonstrated that air and sea mobility are the keys to large scale deployments.

An effective and flexible command and control system for the JCF would require functional areas in an army corps HQ to include an air staff to coordinate air operations and navy and marine staff elements. Most important would be the ability for the HQ to deploy world-wide and plug into a variety of national and international command and control systems.

Land/Air Components. In accordance with the U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine, or Air/Land Battle, the ground force element must be capable of strategic mobility, probably by air, and be equipped with sufficient firepower to defend itself. For the scale of operations envisaged, the army element should include an Airborne Division, and an Air Assault Division. These formations must be composed of fully active divisions which would possess the advantages of strategic mobility, firepower, maneuverability on the battlefield, and sustainability. Equipment limitations would include the lack of organic heavy artillery fire support, limited protection and defense against armor, and limited protection against NBC fires. Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono has stated that the Army of the future must be versatile, lethal and deployable. (31:31-34) The significant advantages offered by technology should enable Army units to be able to operate against greatly superior numbers in both offensive and defensive actions: the role of the JCF rather than the USCENTCOM.

The Air component of the JCF would include a suitable mix of the composite wings proposed by General McPeak.(32:9) Each wing offers the advantage of having those elements required to form offensive and defensive force packages under a single operational commander. The composite wing example mentioned above highlights a multi-role day/night and air superiority capability, but the proposal could also include a strategic bomber force to support the JCF. Not only would the units train and operate together on a regular basis, but mutually supporting air elements would be based on the same unit in peacetime. The command and control arrangements outlined for the composite wing would enable authority to be delegated, thus allowing mission type orders to be passed down to wing level.

Special force elements would also have a vital role to play in future defense arrangements because they offer a wide range of options accross the spectrum of conflict. Although the JCF would require that special forces be woven into many joint operations, individual units would also have a part to play, particularly in the area of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, where their particular skills would be required.

Naval/Marine Units. The power of the naval/air arm lies, in part, in the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), and two such groups would provide both power projection and combat power at sea for the JCF. The CVBG is capable of aerial, surface and subsurface warfare, and the force would also be

able to support a Marine Corps force of less than divisional strength. This potent combination would offer the JCF the flexibility and significant offensive capabilities inherent in the carrier task force. Carrier-based aircraft may well be the first tactical aircraft suitable and available for employment in an emergency situation. The integrated capability of the CVBG offers many of the advantages of the composite wing at sea, and it is also able to support amphibious operations and land campaigns, particularly in littoral states.

The combined arms doctrine adopted by the US Marine Corps adds another dimension to the warfighting capabilities of the JCF.(33:76) This can be provided by the complementary use of a wide variety of weapons from hand-held weapons within small fire teams on the one hand to close air support assets in support of an infantry penetration at the level of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) on the other.

CONCLUSION

It now seems certain that the US armed forces will be reduced in the future, both in terms of manpower and defense spending. As the structure of the new force takes shape, there will be great pressure to become even more efficient, but effectiveness will have to be maintained to make the best use of every defense dollar. As US national interests continue to be reviewed, and as the significant changes

continue to be monitored in the Soviet Union, force capabilities will have to match achievable military objectives. It may not be possible to repeat the scale of operations undertaken during Operation Desert Shield/Storm without a greater share of the burden being borne by other nations of the world. Instability still exists throughout the world and the risks of conflict remain, a growing number of conflicts in the Third World, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction have the potential to threaten US interests. The new force structure for the US armed services will have to be focused on smaller and more mobile force elements, to include the command and control necessary for joint force operations.

Downsizing may lead to disagreements between the arms of the Services as each tries to show that it is capable of meeting the defence requirements of the nation, and fights for a share of the greatly reduced budget. The shape of the force of the future will be better decided upon by the DOD than by politicians, but intervention rather than ratification by the Congress remains a possibility. Force projection capabilities will need to be addressed when examining the new force structure.

This paper has proposed establishment of a JCF to replace the functions and responsibilities of the USCENTCOM. The proposed command and control arrangements will allow healthy inter-service rivalry to be managed within the force to ensure that legislation is not required. The close

scrutiny of the armed forces by the Congress will continue to ensure that warfighting capability is improved, and "jointness" is exercised where military options are considered.

The mistakes of the past caused by the desire of all arms of the service to be involved in all military actions, regardless of the desirability of such involvement, must not be allowed to influence future decisions of the DOD. The more numerous the layers involved in the decision-making process, the greater the likelihood of the wrong decision being taken.

The JCF would be a truly joint force under the command of one CINC, in peace and war. Training would be possible at all levels and throughout the force for realistic options within a large AOR. Individual service identities would most certainly be retained, and the JCF would comply with the spirit of integration directed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The unified commander would be able to decide on the training program at home and abroad, the levels of involvement for military assistance programmes and on the units under command to be used for a wide range of contingencies throughout his AOR. Direction from the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS would ensure that the armed services continue to serve the nation in a coordinated and effective fashion into the next decade.

The scale of the downsizing now being undertaken demands that a major review of force structures is necessary. The

correct balance will not be obtained by simply reducing forces within their existing organization. The JCF will provide an integrated unit under simplified command and control arrangements to meet the needs of a unified command into the next century.

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